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SURVEY

OF ILLINOIS LAW-1951-1952

having sustained personal injuries by reason of her husband's
negligent operation of an automobile, sought to recover damages
24
from him on the basis that the several Married Women's Acts
had removed the common-law rule. The Appellate Court for the
First District found difficulties with this argument which it considered to be insuperable. In the first place, the acts do not
purport to remove the husband's common law disability from suing
his wife in tort so a construction thereof which would permit a suit
by the wife would create an inequality between the sexes contrary
to the policy contemplated by the legislature. 2 5 Secondly, the
Married Women's Acts were said to have expressly removed only
those disabilities peculiar to married women, giving such persons
the right to sue separately in only a limited group of cases, hence
were inadequate to remove common law disabilities between the
spouses. A forthright decision by the Supreme Court or substantial statutory revision by the legislature would now seem to be in
the offing.
VI.

PROPERTY

REAL AND PFESONAL PROPERTY

Little has been said concerning the acquisition of present
rights by way of title to land in Illinois, for most cases involving
aspects of real property law were of a stereotyped nature. One
significant point was made, however, in the case of Miner v. Yantis.1
The plaintiffs there concerned, who owned the record title to the
land involved, sought to have a deed to the realty and a bill of sale
for the school house erected thereon, purchased by the defendants
from the school trustees, set aside. The suit presented three technically novel questions. The first challenged the power of school
trustees to acquire title to realty in fee simple absolute except in
those cases where the title was taken either in satisfaction of a
judgment or in settlement of a debt. The second posed a question
24 I1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, §§ 1-21.
25 Evidence of a design to provide equality of rights appears in Ill. Rev. Stat.
1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, §§ 3, 5, 8, and 11.
1410 Ill. 401, 102 N. E. (2d) 524 (1951).
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as to whether or not school trustees could acquire title to land by
adverse possession. The third dealt with reversionary rights in
school buildings, erected on land acquired by school trustees
under an exercise of the power of eminent domain, after the tract
ceased to be used for school purposes. The Supreme Court answered the first question in the affirmative, stating that the question implied too narrow a construction of the statutory power of
school trustees 2 who could, by proper grant, take title in fee
simple absolute. The second question was also answered affirmatively, the court noting that it had never before passed upon the
question but resting its decision on analogy 3 as well as on a general rule that governmental entities may acquire title by adverse
possession. 4 On the third point, and again reasoning from
analogy, 5 the court held that the statute placed a separate title
to school buildings in the school trustees, and that whether the
site had been acquired by deed, written or verbal lease, by permissive use, or, as in the instant case, by the right of eminent
domain. As a consequence, the common-law doctrine pertaining
to fixtures was held not to be applicable, with the result that the
plaintiff's relief was limited to the setting aside of the deed only.
The much litigated question of the uses to which Chicago's
lake-front Grant Park may be put was again before the Illinois
Supreme Court, this time in the case of Michigan Boulevard Building Company v. Chicago Park District6 wherein the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to prevent the defendant from putting
into operation a plan to construct an underground parking garage
in Grant Park across the street from plaintiff's large office building. The case provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity
to make several new holdings concerning the rights in land prob2 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 122, § 4-21.
3 Foote v. City of Chicago, 368 Ill. 307, 13 N. E. (2d) 965 (1938).
4 In that regard, see I Am. Jur., Adverse Possession, § 17. The court, however,
indicated that the use made by the school trustees had never ripened into an
adverse possession.
5 The cases of Hackett v. Trustees of Schools, 398 Ill. 27, 74 N. E. (2d) 869
(1947) ; Brown v. Trustees of Schools, 403 Ill. 154. 85 N. E. (2d) 747 (1949); and
Low v. Blakeney, 403 Ill. 156, 85 N. E. (2d) 741 (1949). deal with related aspects
of the problem. See also note in 27 CHIcAGO-KENT LAw REvIEw 340.
6412 Il1. 350, 106 N. E. (2d) 359 (1952).
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lems inherent in the Grant Park legal situation. In the first place,
the court agreed with the plaintiff's contention that it was established case law in Illinois that it would be improper to divert a
dedicated park from the park purpose for which it was so dedicated. 7 It pointed out, however, that while the resolution accepting the dedication in question stated that the land should be
enclosed as a public park, the original common-law dedication
had made no such restriction as it had specified that the land
should be used for "public" purposes. Even if the original
common-law dedication had been limited to "park" purposes,
there was precedent elsewhere supporting the construction of
underground parking garages in public parks." While agreeing
with another contention of the plaintiff, to-wit: that the so-called
Ward cases 9 had determined that it was the intent and purpose of
the common-law dedication to prohibit the erection of buildings
on the land constituting the park area, the court pointed out that
the former cases referred to surface buildings only, hence would
not serve to prevent underground construction.
The court then proceeded to dispose of another argument, one
to the effect that easements created in favor of the abutting landowners at the time of the dedication would be violated. In that
regard the court found that no violation would occur since any
easement rights arose out of the dedicatory restrictions and these
had been determined to be left unhampered by the proposed construction. Having observed that the character of the abutting
landowners' easement rights had never before been defined, the
court pronounced them to be easements to light, to air, and for
view. 10 It followed therefrom that there would be no unlawful
7 See, for example, Melin v. Community Cons. School Dist., 312 Ill. 376, 144 N. E.
13 (1924) ; Village of Riverside v. Maclean, 210 Ill. 308, 71 N. E. 408, 66 L. R. A.
288 (1904) ; Village of Princeville v. Auten, 77 Ill. 325 (1875) ; City of Jacksonville
v. Jacksonville Railway Co., 67 Ill. 540 (1873).
8 City and County of San Francisco v. Linares, 16 Cal. (2d) 441, 106 P. (2d) 369
(1940) ; Lowell v. City of Boston, 322 Mass. 709, 79 N. E. (2d) 713 (1948).
9 Prior litigation over Grant Park may be found in City of Chicago v. Ward, 169
Ill. 392, 48 N. E. 927, 38 L. R. A. 849 (1897) ; Bliss v. Ward, 198 Ill. 104, 64 N. E.
705 (1902) : Ward v. Field Museum, 241 Ill. 496, 89 N. E. 731 (1909) ; South Park
Com'rs v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 248 Ill. 299, 93 N. H. 910 (1910).
10 The definition would not seem to be as broad as an abutter's own description,
for the element of "passage" was not included. See McCormick v. Chicago Yacht
Club, 331 Ill. 514, 163 N. E. 418, 60 A. L. R. 763 (1928).
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diversion in the use of a boulevard laid out on the dedicated land
if the subsurface thereof was used to regulate and control traffic
upon the surface."
Future, rather than present, interests in land were dealt with
in several other noteworthy cases, two of them presenting questions never before decided in Illinois. One of these new cases,
that of Spicer v. Moss,'12 presented an issue concerning the destructability of contingent remainders under the Contingent Remainder Act.' 3 A grant by warranty deed had been made to A
and the heirs of her body if any such heirs should survive her,
but if no heirs of the body should survive her, then to the heirs
of the body of B.' 4 A died without leaving heirs of her body,
but she was survived by B. As the grant had not provided for
this fact situation, the heirs of B's body being neither ascertained
nor ascertainable, interpretation was necessary. As a preliminary
matter, the conveyance was held to have created a life estate in A,
with a contingent remainder in favor of the heirs of the body of A,
and an alternative contingent remainder to the heirs of the body
of B. 15 It was contended, in a suit by persons claiming through A
to remove a cloud on title, that, because the alternative contingent
estate in the heirs of B's body was not ready to take possession
at A's death, it failed and was destroyed under the common-law
rule that a contingent remainder must vest eo instanti the preced11 Barsaloux v. City of Chicago, 245 Ill. 598, 92 N. E. 525 (1910).
12409 Ill. 343, 100 N. E. (2d) 761 (1951), noted in 40 Ill. B. 3. 184, 46 Ill. L. Rev.
925, and 28 N. Dak. L. Rev. 225.
13 Il. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 40, provides in part that "no future interest
shall fail or be defeated by the determination of any precedent estate or interest
prior to the happening of the event or contingency on which the future interest is
limited to take effect."
14 Certain additional facts required the decision of another issue.
At the
grantor's death, A had inherited a reversion in one-third of the property involved.
She and her husband executed a warranty deed of all her interest to X who, on
the next day, reconveyed to A, all for the purpose of destroying the contingent
remainders and to enable A, the life tenant, to convey at least a one-third fee
interest in the property. The court held, however, under a well-established estoppel
rule peculiar to Illinois, that A, as grantor in the original warranty deed, was
obligated to defend rather than to destroy the interests created thereunder, hence
the contingent remainders to the heirs of the body of B were not destroyed by the
attempted merger. Plaintiff, who had claimed through a quit-claim deed from A
and her husband, was unsuccessful In his attempt to remove a cloud on title.
15 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 5.
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ing supporting estate determines.1 6 The Supreme Court, however,
apparently for the first time, held that the statute in question preserved contingent remainders in this situation, i. e., where the
preceding estate terminated naturally, as well as in those cases
where the remainders would have been destroyed by a merger
under the common-law rule.
The rules to guide in the construction of substitutional gifts
effective in case of "death" of the first taker were reconsidered
and clarified by the Supreme Court in Harris Trust & Savings
Bank v. Jackson.1 7 Under the terms of the testamentary trust
there involved, income was to be paid to the two life beneficiaries,
after which the trust was to terminate and the trustee was to distribute the principal to "my nephew, Arthur S. Jackson, or if he
be dead, then to his lawful heirs." The named nephew predeceased both life tenants leaving a widow who, in an action by the
bank as trustee for construction, argued that the nephew, being
dead, took nothing, but that she, his widow and his heir, took a
substitutional gift. The administrator of the testator's wife, the
wife having been a surviving life tenant, argued that the nephew,
by reason of the fact that he had survived the testator, had acquired an indefeasibly vested remainder, for which reason the
trust principal should be transferred to the nephew's executor,
rather than to his heirs at law. The court held that the plain
terminology used by the testator clearly indicated that, on the
death of the life tenants, the trustee was to deliver the trust
assets to the nephew if living, but if dead then to his heirs, and,
there being no room for construction, the application of technical
rules of construction would be unnecessary and improper. Finding the law of constructional rules, as argued by the parties, to be
unsettled, the court then sought to clarify the same, particularly
with regard to whether a reference to the death of the first taker,
here the nephew, contemplated death at a time prior to the testator's death, or merely at any time prior to the death of the last
life tenant. It said that the cases of Murphy v. Westerhoff' 8
16 1 Simes, Law of Future Interests, § 98, p. 165.
17412 I1. 261, 106 N. E. (2d) 188 (1952), noted in 1952 Ii. L. Forum 456.
18 386 I1. 136, 53 N. E. (2d) 931 (1944).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

and Peadro v. Peadro,19 insofar as they construed "death" of
the first taker to mean death before the death of the testator,
should be limited, and the rule of Smith v. Shepard20 was still
the law in this field, that is when a gift over is preceded by a
particular estate, the gift over will usually take effect if the contingency happens at any time during the period of the particular
estate.
In another case involving construction, that of Stern v.
Stern,21 the court held that gifts had been created by implication.
The testator, by will, had given his son Carl an option to purchase
the testator's farm within two years of testator's death or within
one year after the death of testator's wife, whichever should occur
later. A general residuary clause benefited the children equally.
Although it appeared that testator had not contemplated the situation of the son dying within the option period, he had included
a provision substituting the children of any child who should
predecease him, the testator. In a proceeding by testator's widow
and certain descendants for partition, instituted following the
death of Carl, who had died about a month later than the testator
but who left five children, the contention was advanced that the
son's descendants were barred from exercising the option. The
Supreme Court nevertheless held that a gift of the right to exercise the option was to be implied in favor of the son's descendants
in view of the general plan of the testator to benefit them. That
result was dictated, the court said, because it was "necessarily implied that the descendants of Carl should have the same opportunity to exercise the option where Carl died directly after the
testator, but before he could exercise the option, as they would
have had if Carl had died the day before the testator's death,"
22
which contingency was specifically covered by the will.
19400 Ill. 482, 81 N. E. (2d)

192 (1948), noted in 28 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

72.
20 370 Ill. 491, 19 N. E. (2d) 368 (1939).
21410 Ill. 377, 102 N. E. (2d) 104 (1952), noted in 1952 Ill. L. Forum 303.
22 410 Ill. 377 at 386, 102 N. E. (2d) 104 at 109. It may be questioned whether a
better result might not have been based on the survival statute: Ill. Rev. Stat.
1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 494. If, as the court held in this case, the option right was
not personal, hence did survive, it would seem that this right should have passed
to the son's widow, under his will naming her as sole heir and devisee, rather than
to the descendants of the son.

SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-1951-1952

The last of these cases dealt with a new question of accumulations under the so-called Thellusson Act. 23 In United States
Trust Company of New York v. Jones, 2 4 a conveyance had been
made in 1916 to a trust company in trust for the benefit of the
settlor's five children. The trust agreement, among other things,
provided that, out of income, the trustee should "pay all taxes,
assessments or other governmental charges which it may be re.
because or in respect of any part of the
quired to pay .
principal." Some twenty-five years after the death of the settlor,
part of the trust res was sold at a gain which was added to corpus.
The trustee paid a capital gains tax thereon and then brought
suit to determine whether the tax so paid should be charged against
income or corpus. On appeal from a decree that the tax was
chargeable against income, the issue was presented, for the first
time in Illinois, whether the Illinois rule against accumulations
of income would be violated by payment of the capital gains tax
out of income. The income beneficiaries argued that if the amount
of tax, taken from income, were to be effectively frozen into capital,
the charge against income would then violate the statute. The
Appellate Court for the First District, affirming the decree, held
that as none of the income which would otherwise have gone to
the beneficiaries was paid into the trust corpus, the payment of
the tax from income, pursuant to the mandate of the trust instrument, did not constitute an improper accumulation in violation
of the statute.
Only one problem of conveyancing seems to have added anything to state law. The counterplaintiff in Jonas v. Meyers25
sought reformation of a deed whereby his predecessor in title had
made a gift which, because of a scrivener 's mistake, had erroneously included more land than was intended to be granted. The
evidence showed that the grantees named in said deed had no
knowledge of the error in the conveyance at the time of its execution and delivery. Appealing from a decree allowing reformation,
23 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 153.
24 346 fll. App. 365, 105 N. E. (2d) 122 (1952). Leave to appeal has been allowed.
25 410 Ill. 213, 101 N. E. (2d) 509 (1951), noted In 40 Ill. B. J. 234.
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the counterdefendant argued, among other things, that the decree
ought not be sustained because of an absence of mutual mistake.
The Supreme Court recognized it to be well-settled law in Illinois
that there must ordinarily be mutuality of mistake before a deed
or other written contract can be reformed ;26 that if a grantor does
not intend to include a portion of a tract in a deed but the grantee
does so intend, there can be no reformation ;27 and that where a
mistake is unilateral the deed should be rescinded or cancelled but
not reformed. 2 The opinion went on to point out, however, that
many jurisdictions recognize an exception to these general rules
and permit the donor-grantor of a voluntary conveyance, or his
heirs or successors in title, to have reformation as against the
grantee where a mistake has occurred and, in such cases, mutuality of mistake is not essential.2 9 The decision, therefore, by
affirming the decree, has incorporated the exception into Illinois
law.
Apparent misunderstanding concerning rights of survivorship
in joint bank accounts, certificates of deposit, and other personal
property, renders the case of Johnson v. Mueller 30 worthy of
mention although it merely affirms prior law. In certain citation
proceedings begun there to compel an administratrix to account
for certificates of deposit issued and made payable jointly to her
and the decedent, or to the survivor, it was argued that the Joint
Rights and Obligations Act 3 ' required an agreement signed by all
parties in order to establish the right of survivorship. The Appellate Court for the Fourth District rejected the idea that an agreement would be indispensable in such a case and, affirming an
earlier holding,3 2 held that any reference to an agreement
in the statute in question related only to acquittance of the issuing
26 Gromer v. Molby, 385 Ill. 283, 52 N. E. (2d) 772 (1944).
27 Bivins v. Kerr, 268 Ill. 164, 108 N. E. 996 (1915).
28 Schaefer v. Henze, 337 Ill. 41, 168 N. E. 625 (1929).
29 See Reinberg v. Helby, 404 ll. 247, 88 N. E. (2d) 848 (1949), noted in 28
CHIOAGO-K-NT LAW REVIw 278, and 45 Am. Jur., Reformation of Instruments, § 31.
30 346 I1. App. 199, 104 N. E. (2d) 651 (1952).
31 IMi. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 76, § 1 et seq.
32 Vaughan v. Millikin National Bank, 263 11. App. 301 (1931).
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bank. 8 As there was clear and convincing proof of donative
intent concerning the certificates in question, the certificates were
held to be effective and the survivor was adjudged entitled thereto.
LANDLRD AND TENANT

Three unique questions concerning the landlord-tenant relationship were propounded during the year. In the tort action of
4
a suit by a lessee against a lessor involving
Wagner v. Keper,3
a latent defect problem, it became important to know at exactly
what time the letting commenced in order to ascertain whether or
not tort liability existed. 5 If the month to month tenancy there
involved was a continuous one, the landlord would not be liable
for having leased premises containing a nuisance. If, on the
other hand, each new month of occupation constituted a new
demise, liability would exist. The Supreme Court, having traced
the genealogy of the question through the earlier cases, and
taking into account the treatment given to the problem by textwriters and by the courts of other jurisdictions, held that the
tenancy was to be regarded as continuous from the time of the
original letting.
A public housing authority tenant who refused to pay a small
sum as additional rent for excess use of electricity, determined
according to a schedule which was part of the lease, received little
encouragement from the Appellate Court for the First District
in the case of Chicago Housing Authority v. Bild.88 The tenant
had argued, in defense of an action for forcible entry and detainer, 37 that since the statute conferred no right to possession on
33111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 76, §2(a), provides in part that "when an
agreement permitting such payment is signed by all said persons at the time the
account is opened or thereafter, the receipt or acquittance of the person so paid
shall be valid and sufficient discharge from all parties to the bank for any payments
so made." It is identical with IlL Laws 1919, p. 634, which actually controlled the
case under consideration.
34411 Ill. 368, 104 N. E. (2d) 231 (1951), reversing 342 Ill. App. 136, 95 N. E.
(2d) 533 (1950).
35 A note on the tort liability of landlords in Illinois appears in 1952 Ill. L.
Forum 417.
36 346 Ill. App. 272, 104 N. E. (2d) 666 (1952).
37 Suit was based on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 80, § 8, for an alleged nonpayment of rent.
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the lessor unless the tenant had defaulted in the payment of
"rent," as defined in its common law context, an action for possession would not lie as the charge for electricity was not "rent."
Rejecting that argument, the court pointed out that under modern
conditions, particularly in urban areas where multiple dwelling
houses are common, there has been a broadening of the common
law concept of rent for the parties may stipulate to include the
furnishing of services such as electricity, gas and water as part
of the consideration for the monthly rental agreed upon. Provisions with respect to the payment of taxes, insurance premiums
and repairs have been recognized as valid stipulations intended
to create additional rent obligations on the lessee. One for the
payment for an additional sum for an excessive use of electricity
would fall in the same category.
The question raised in the case of 400 North Rush, Inc. v.
Bielzoif38 was whether or not a lessee of commercial premises
would be entitled to the use and possession of the exterior walls
thereof. The defendant had taken a five-year lease to the top two
floors of a building. The lease contained provisions allowing the
defendant to erect a sign on the exterior walls of the floors leased
provided the lessor consented to the specifications before the sign
was constructed. After the defendant had erected an exterior
sign on the leased premises, a dispute arose between the landlord
and the tenant as to whether or not the defendant had received
the plaintiff's consent. The landlord thereafter brought a forcible
entry and detainer proceeding for that portion of the exterior of
the building covered by the sign, contending that an unlawful possession had been taken thereof. The Appellate Court for the
First District, reversing and remanding a trial court judgment
in favor of the lessor, relied on the principle that the exterior
walls of leased premises are part and parcel of the estate demised,8 9 hence there could be no trespass by the defendant when a
sign was affixed to the exterior wall which had been leased to the
38 347 Ill. App. 123, 106 N. E. (2d) 208 (1952).

39 The court quoted with approval from Lowell v. Strahan, 145 Mass. 1, 12 N. E.
401 (1887), and Riddle v. Littlefield, 53 N. H. 503, 16 Am. Rep. 388 (1873).
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tenant. The court intimated, however, that a suit for breach of
covenant might lie.
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS

40
In addition to certain suretyship cases already mentioned,
a few additional cases dealt with the claims of persons seeking
security for their rights as creditors. For example, well-established principles regarding the right of a creditor to redeem from
a foreclosure of a real-estate mortgage were involved in the case
of Wojcik v. Stolecki 4l but the case is worthy of notice because of
the argument offered therein by the purchaser at the foreclosure
sale designed to defeat the right of redemption. One contention
turned on the claim that the redeeming judgment creditor had
no standing inasmuch as the land in question was registered under
the Torrens System and the judgment relied on had not been
entered until after the foreclosure sale had taken place. Another
was to the effect that redemption privileges did not exist in registered land inasmuch as the Torrens Act made no provision therefor. Both contentions were swept aside when the Supreme Court
upheld the attempted redemption, first because the redeeming
creditor need only have a valid judgment at the time of redemption, 4 2 and second, because the statutory provisions regarding
redemption were deemed to be incorporated into the Torrens Act
48
by reference.

It has long been the theory justifying the granting of a
mechanics' lien that the labor, services, or materials of the lien
claimant have so gone into the structure erected on the land as
to make it impossible for him to secure the return thereof in case
of non-payment and, except for a suit for the contract price, the
lien claimant would then be destitute of remedy unless some form
of statutory lien be authorized in his behalf.4 4 If, by reason of
Contracts, particularly notes 35 to 42.
41411 Ill. 443, 104 N. E. (2d) 288 (1952).
42 The court relied on Kerr v. Miller, 259 Ill. 516, 102 N. E. 1050 (1913).
43 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 110.
44 Such a lien is granted by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 82, § 1 et seq., to
those who furnished material "used for the purposes of or in the building" erected
on the land.
40 See ante, Division II,
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contract, the claimant would be entitled to recapture the improvement made, the theoretical basis for the lien would then be
removed, hence it has been held that no statutory mechanics' lien
may be claimed where personal property has been sold on conditional sale basis, even though the personal property has become
incorporated in the realty or in the improvements made thereon.4 5
The Appellate Court for the Second District, in the case of Stevens
v. David,46 while not directly challenging earlier views on the
subject, nevertheless saw fit, during the year, to enforce a lien
on behalf of the vendor under a conditional sales contract whose
automatic oil burner had become incorporated in the structure.
That result was reached because the court was of the opinion that
the land owner, defendant therein, had not directly put in issue
the vendor's right to maintain such a lien. The decision would
appear to be difficult to justify in view of the fact that the lien
claimant, in his own complaint, had alleged that the burner was
furnished on a conditional sales basis, thereby revealing that he
was not a person entitled to the benefit of the statute on which
he relied. Since the question could have been raised by a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a case, 4 7 it would seem the question
of law thus generated would still be open to consideration under
exceptions to a master's report or by way of objection to a decree
foreclosing the purported lien,4" so the failure to urge the specific
defense through an answer should hardly have been visited with
the penalty here deemed proper.
Cases involving the operation and effect of trust receipts, a
form of financing device, are relatively rare in Illinois,49 hence
45 In particular, see Ley Fuel Co. v. Weisman, 265 IMI. App. 185 (1932).
The doctrine thereof was approved in Nu-Way Boiler & Engineering Co. v. Morensky, 268
Ill. App. 211 (1932).
46344 Ill. App. 251, 100 N. E. (2d) 526 (1951). Dove, J., dissented.
47 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 169, permits the use of such a motion
where the defect Is apparent on the face of the complaint.
48 The court relied on Illinois Interior Finish Co. v. Poenie, 277 Ill. App. 554
(1934), but the case was one in which there could have been a clear basis for a
lien if the right to a lien had not been waived. A failure to claim a waiver In the
answer was held to preclude proof on the point.
49A discussion of People v. Levin, 412 Ill. 11, 104 N. E. (2d) 814 (1952), is set
out above, Division IV, Criminal Law and Procedure, notes 17 to 19. That case
deals with the constitutionality of certain penal provisions In Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951,
Vol. 2, Ch. 121%, § 183, relating to trust receipts.
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there is more than passing interest in the case of North American
5" for
Acceptance Corporation v. Northern Illinois Corporation
it illustrates the extent to which a well-planned trust receipt
transaction may operate to provide security against later creditors.
The entruster there concerned took all proper steps to establish a
valid trust receipt over a certain automobile which the dealertrustee kept on the showroom floor. Sometime later the dealertrustee purported to sell the car on a conditional sale basis to one
of its employees and thereafter assigned the conditional sale contract and note arising from that transaction to another financing
organization which paid value. When the trustee became financially involfed, the entruster took possession of the automobile
and later sold the same to a third person. On the basis thereof,
the assignee of the conditional sale contract claimed that a conversion of its property rights had occurred as it deemed itself
to be a "good faith" purchaser within the meaning of the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act. 5 1 Both the trial court and the Appellate
Court for the Second District, however, disagreed with that contention, holding that the knowledge of the buyer-employee regarding the original trust receipt transaction prevented his purchase, and the coincidental conditional sale contract to the plaintiff, from being of bona fide effect.
Mention was made last year of a decision of a federal district
court, sitting in this locality, on an issue of pledge law treating
with the pledgee's right, after suit on the original debt contract
had become barred by limitation, to realize satisfaction from the
collateral security still in the pledgee 's hands.5 2 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the holding in
that case, on appeal to it,5 although it too could find no express
warrant for such a holding in Illinois law and had to rely an analo50 347 Ill. App. 89, 106 N. E. (2d) 197 (1952). Leave to appeal has been denied.
5i In. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 1211/2, § 174, is designed to protect purchasers
in good fqth, whether they purchase the article in the ordinary course of trade or
become bona fide transferees of negotiable paper, so long as notice of the prior trust
receipt transaction is lacking.
52 See note on Dorsey v. Reconstruction Finance Co., 96 F. Supp. 31 (1951), In
30 CHICAO-KEI'T LAW REVIMW 89-90.
53 197 F. (2d) 468 (1952).
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gies provided by doctrines relating to the rights of an unpaid
mortgagee in possession. The analogy may be a strained one, for
while such a mortgagee in possession may not be ousted prior to
payment of the debt, 54 the law is far from clear as to his right
to maintain an affirmative action to foreclose the lien, otherwise
barred, 55 simply because he had been in possession all the time.
TRUSTS

Some aspects of trust law have already been noted5" but it
might be said, by way of addition, that the case of Bowman v.
Pettersen5 7 contains an excellent discussion of the law regarding
purchase money resulting trusts and the case of Bremer v.
Bremer58 provides a similar commentary on doctrines relating
to constructive trusts.
Two other cases call for more extended comment. An interesting question pertaining to land trusts was decided by the Supreme Court in Breen v. Breen. 59 The trust agreement there concerned provided, as is usual in cases of that type, that the interests of the trust beneficiaries in the real estate forming the corpus
of the trust were to be considered as personal property, and that
no beneficiary should have any right, title or interest in or to any
portion of the real estate but only in the proceeds arising therefrom. The agreement further provided that the trustee should
convey the property only when directed to do so by the beneficiaries and that any property which remained in the trust twenty
years after creation should be sold by the trustee and the proceeds
divided among the beneficiaries. Twenty years had elapsed and
the trustee had made no preparation to sell the property when
one of the beneficiaries filed a partition suit. The trial court dismissed that action because it was of the opinion that the interests
Fountain v. Bookstaver, 141 Il. 461, 31 N. E. 17 (1892).
55 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 11, forbids the commencement of such a
suit unless begun "within ten years after the right of action" accrues.
56 The case of United States Trust Co. of New York v. Jones, 346 11. App. 365,
105 N. E. (2d) 122 (1952), is noted above, this section, at note 24, ante.
57410 Ill. 519, 102 N. E. (2d) 787 (1952).
58411 Ill. 454, 104 N. E. (2d) 299 (1952).
59 411 Ill. 206, 103 N. E. (2d) 625 (1952).
54
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of the several beneficiaries, being personal property, were not
subject to partition."
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. It
pointed out that the trust had not come to an end merely because
of the trustee's failure to sell the property after the expiration of
twenty years, hence the interest of the beneficiaries had not thereby
become converted into an equitable interest in land. If the trustee
failed to wind up the trust within a reasonable time, the court
indicated that the remedy was by way of a suit to compel the
trustee to fulfill fiduciary duties or to secure removal of the
trustee.
The second case, that of Stone v. Baldwin,6 spells out the
considerations which should govern a court in appointing a successor trustee. In making such an appointment, the chancellor
is not bound by the wishes of the beneficiaries and is not required
to confine his appointment to those persons suggested by them.
He may appoint a sole trustee instead of several trustees, or he
may appoint several trustees in place of one. In short, the
chancellor may exercise a sound discretion in such matters. It
was there indicated, by the Appellate Court for the Second District, that an attorney who represented the former trustee, who
had resigned, ought not be appointed as successor trustee, or successor co-trustee, particularly not when the beneficiaries were
claiming that an order procured by the attorney in behalf of his
client, the former trustee, for compensation out of the trust estate,
was an unwarranted one. Acting as an attorney for his client,
he would be under an obligation to exert all proper efforts to
secure the compensation for his client. If he were appointed
trustee, he would, in accordance with the wishes of the beneficiaries, have to fight the claim which he previously had helped
to enforce. The conflict in interest would obviously be sufficient
to prevent that faithful discharge of duty to be expected of a
trustee.
60 Suits for partition under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 106, § 1 et seq., are
limited to cases where "lands, tenements or hereditaments" are held in joint tenancy
or tenancy in common.
61 Sub nom. Smith v. Champion, 347 Ill. App. 128, 106 N. E. (2d) 379 (1952).
Leave to appeal has been allowed.
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WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION

A number of wills cases are worthy of attention, some of
them presenting questions new in Illinois. Notice has been drawn
to the case of Dillman v. Dillman6 2 which reaffirms the earlier
established principle 8 that the widow is, and has been, technically
an "heir at law" since the adoption of the 1923 Descent Act, 64
by reason whereof the phrase "heir at law" is to be given its
technical statutory meaning unless the testator expresses a contrary intention.
A strained construction of the statute governing inheritance
by illegitimates6 5 enabled the court, in Calamia v. Dempsey,6 6 to
hold that the decedent was, in effect, the "maternal ancestor" of
an illegitimate paternal aunt of his, by reason of which the aunt
was entitled to inherit, taking precedence over legitimate first
cousins. Although the 1872 statute6 7 had provided that an illegitimate could inherit from "any person from whom its mother might
have inherited, if living," no equivalent language was carried
over into the 1939 revision.68 The court, however, did not consider
this difference conclusive but, expressly applying what was substantially the test of the 1872 statute, it adverted to "an intention
upon the part of the Legislature to remove the rigors of the
common law" as well as to the rule of Section 9 of the Probate
Act,6 9 one requiring a liberal construction.
62409 Ill. 494, 100 N. E. (2d) 567 (1951), noted in 1951 Ill. L. Forum 160.
63 Bundy v. Solon, 384 Ill. 137, 51 N. E. (2d) 183 (1943). The note in 1951 Il1. L.
Forum 160 reviews all prior cases said to imply a contrary rule. See also Zacharias,
"Husband and Wife as Heir Under Testate Succession," 12 CHIOAGO-KEKT LAw
Rzvmw 264-292 (1934).
64 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1923, Ch. 39, § 1, for the first time provided that, where a
decedent was survived by both a spouse and descendants, the surviving spouse
should receive an absolute one-third of each parcel of real estate of which the
decedent died seized, if the surviving spouse adequately waived his or her right to
dower. See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 162.
65 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 163, provides that an "illegitimate child
is heir of his mother and of any maternal ancestor; and In all cases where representation is provided for by this Act an Illegitimate child represents his mother
and his lawful issue represent him and take, by descent, any estate which the
parent would have taken, if living."
66344 l. App. 503, 101 N. E. (2d) 611 (1951), noted in 40 Ill. B. J. 289.
67 Laws 1872, p. 352, § 2.
68 See text set forth in note 65, ante.
69 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 159.
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The case of First National Bank of Chicago v. People70 concerned the question whether the widow of a child acknowledged,
but not adopted, by a step-father should stand in the favored class
of relatives, upon whom the lowest rate of inheritance tax is
imposed, with respect to property inheritances, devises or bequests from the step-father. The statute favors surviving spouses
of children, surviving spouses of adopted children of the decedent,
and the acknowledged child, but it does not mention the surviving
spouse of an acknowledged child.7 ' The Supreme Court held that,
because of the statutory omission and because of the other statutory differences between acknowledged and adopted children,7 2
the widow of the acknowledged child was not in the favored
statutory class.
One case in which the contestant failed to establish undue
influence should serve to re-emphasize the rule that, in order to
raise the presumption of undue influence, it must be shown that
the child-beneficiary was instrumental in causing the will to be
drawn, and that the mere existence of a friendly or confidential
relationship will not be sufficient, but indeed, may even tend to
rebut such a presumption.73 Thus, in Lake v. Seiffert,74 it was
held that the trial court had properly excluded the contestants'
evidence and had correctly directed a verdict for the defendant,
because the contestants had failed to introduce any evidence from
which a jury might infer the essential fact of procurement by the
beneficiary.
Procedural matters of administration occupied the reviewing
courts in several instances. The decision in Ellis v. Union National Bank of Macomb 75 would seem to reflect a misunderstand70

412 Ill. 29, 104 N. E. (2d) 630 (1952).

71 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 375.
72 Ibid., Ch. 3, § 165, makes an adopted child a "descendant," thus an heir at law,
of his adopting parents, for purposes of inheritance, though no like status is given
to the acknowledged child. The court further noted that the 1949 tax section, here
involved, did favor the adopted child of an adopted child, but did not, in terms,
include the adopted child of an acknowledged child. The 1951 amendment to this
section apparently removes the distinction.
78 The court cited Harp v. Parr, 168 Ill. 459, 48 N. E. 113 (1897).
74 410 Ill. 444, 102 N. E. (2d) 294 (1951), noted In 40 111. B. J. 421.
75 345 Ill. App. 100, 102 N. E. (2d) 353 (1951).
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ing of the nature of an action to contest a will. In such a proceeding, a named defendant of unknown address, but actually
residing out of the state, was served by publication and a decree
was entered. Within the one-year period allowed for the setting
aside of chancery decrees based on constructive service, 7 6 the
named defendant filed her petition for that purpose. Notwithstanding cases relied upon by the executor which state that an
action to contest is statutory and not an ordinary chancery
action, 7 the Appellate Court for the Second Distrilct held that the
suit was no different from any other chancery action, hence the
defendant was entitled to a hearing on her petition.
In another case, that of Metropolitan Trust Company v.
Young, 78 it was held, apparently for the first time on this precise
question, that a nunc pro tunc order discharging an administrator,
entered by the probate court during the same term in which the
original order was issued, if without notice to parties affected, 79
would be void, notwithstanding the fact the court still had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter at the time the
nunc pro tunc order was entered.
Two cases regarding claims against estates should be of interest. In one of them, that of In re Bird's Estate,0 the court
intimated, but was not obliged to decide the point, that the limitation period fixed for the filing of claims against a probated
estate binds the state government and its several subordinates.
In the other, that of Northern Trust Company v. Wilson,8' a
widow renounced the will of her deceased husband and elected to
s2
take her statutory share under Section 16 of the Probate Act.
I11. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 174 (8).
See Dickman v. Frieling, 395 Il1. 383, 70 N. E. (2d) 61 (1946).
78 346 Ill. App. 257, 104 N. E. (2d) 850 (1952). Leave to appeal has been allowed.
79 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 174(8), and Rule 60 of the Probate
Court of Cook County.
80 Sub nom. Illinois Public Aid Commission v. Sanderson, 410 fli. 390, 102 N. E.
(2d) 329 (1951), noted in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEW 285.
81344 Ill. App. 508, 101 N. E. (2d) 604 (1951), noted in 40 Ill. B. J. 400. Leave
to appeal has been denied.
82 Ii. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 168.
Methods to be pursued in order to
produce a renunciation were discussed in Leonhart v. Reighard, 409 Ill. 544, 100
N. E. (2d) 657 (1951), a case which holds that the declaration of renunciation need
not be personally signed by the surviving spouse but may be executed, in the
spouse's behalf, by a legal representative such as a conservator.
76
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In the executor's suit for construction and instructions as to
distribution, a decree was entered declaring that the widow took
her statutory share after deduction of the federal estate tax, with
certain exceptions. On appeal, the widow argued that the federal
tax was not a "just claim," within that phrase of Section 16
which declares the surviving spouse entitled to a share "after
payment of all just claims," hence her share ought to be based
upon the size of the estate before taxes. This attempt to pass
the tax burden on to other beneficiaries did not succeed, the court
holding, by analogy to prior cases, s8 that, absent statutory enactment to the contrary, the federal estate tax had to be considered
as a charge against the whole estate rather than against particular
individual shares, thereby producing the apparently just result
obligating the renouncing spouse to bear the tax burden proportionately with the other beneficiaries.
Personal representatives and fiduciaries generally should take
note of the significant decision in Dyslin v. Wolf. 4 It will be
recalled that the appellant-trustees in Glaser v. Chicago Title &
Trust Companys5 had failed in their attempt to surcharge trust
property with the expense of a successful appeal, the court there
affirming their right to appeal but requiring them to take the same
at their own expense. In the instant decision, the Appellate Court
for the Second District held that attorney's fees and expenses for
services to the appellees, who had been brought involuntarily into
the Supreme Court, were properly allowable as expenses of the
estate. Emphasizing the fact that the appellees ought not to be
required to elect between doing nothing or paying their own
expenses, the court interpreted the earlier case of Strauss v.
Strauss8 6 as a precedent for this decision notwithstanding Supreme Court dictum to the contrary in the Glaser case.
83 People v. Pasfileld, 284 Ill. 450, 120 N. E. 286 (1918), and People v. McCormick,
327 Ill. 547, 158 N. E. 861 (1927), both treated the federal estate tax as an expense
of administration, hence deductible before determination of the Illinois inheritance
tax.
An earlier decision, that of
84347 Ill. App. 80, 106 N. E. (2d) 193 (1952).
Dyslin v. Wolf, 407 Ill. 532, 96 N. E. (2d) 485 (1950), was noted in 30 CHICAGOK NT LAw REVIEw 78.
85 401 Ill. 387, 82 N. E. (2d) 446 (1948).
86 293 Ill. App. 364, 12 N. E. (2d) 701 (1938).

